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Abstract We study a class of games with a continuum of players for which
Cournot-Nash equilibria can be obtained by the minimisation of some cost,
related to optimal transport. This cost is not convex in the usual sense in
general but it turns out to have hidden strict convexity properties in many
relevant cases. This enables us to obtain new uniqueness results and a charac-
terisation of equilibria in terms of some partial differential equations, a simple
numerical scheme in dimension one as well as an analysis of the inefficiency of
equilibria.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since Aumann’s seminal works Aumann [1964, 1966], models with a continuum
of agents have occupied a distinguished position in economics and game theory.
Schmeidler [1973] introduced a notion of non-cooperative equilibrium in games with
a continuum of agents and established several existence results. In Schmeidler’s own
words: Non-atomic games enable us to analyze a conflict situation where the single
player has no influence on the situation but the aggregative behavior of ”large” sets
of players can change the payoffs. The examples are numerous: Elections, many
small buyers from a few competing firms, drivers that can choose among several
roads, and so on.
Following the approach of Kohlberg et al. [1974] to Walras equilibrium analysis,
Mas-Colell [1984] reformulated Schmeidler’s analysis in terms of joint distributions
over agents’ actions and characteristics and, in particular, the concept of Cournot-
Nash equilibrium distributions. Not only Mas-Colell’s reformulation enabled him
to obtain general existence results in an easy and elegant way but it is flexible
enough to accommodate quite weak assumptions on the data (which is relevant in
the framework of games with incomplete information and a continuum of players
for instance). Roughly speaking, in analysing Cournot-Nash equilibria in the sense
of Mas-Colell [1984] one can take great advantage of (topological but also geomet-
ric) properties of spaces of probability measures. With this respect, it is natural to
expect that optimal transport theory (which is an extremely active field in research
in mathematics both from an applied and fundamental point, as illustrated by the
monumental textbook Villani [2009]) may be useful.
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Even though there are very general existence results for Cournot-Nash equilib-
ria (see for instance Kahn [1989]) in the literature, we are not aware of classes
of problems where there is uniqueness and a full characterisation of such equilib-
ria which is tractable enough to obtain close-form solutions or efficient numerical
computation schemes. One of our goals is precisely to go one step beyond abstract
existence results (in mixed or pure strategies) and to identify classes of non-atomic
games where Cournot-Nash equilibria are unique and can be fully characterised or
numerically computed.
Given a space of players types X endowed with a probability measure µ ∈ P(X)
(which gives the exogenous distribution of the type of the agents), an action space
Y and a cost Φ: X × Y × P(Y ) → R, x-type agents taking action y pay the cost
Φ(x, y, ν) where ν ∈ P(Y ) represents the action distribution. The fact that this
cost depends on the other agents actions only through the distribution ν means
that who plays what does not matter i.e. the game is anonymous. A Cournot-Nash
equilibrium is a joint probability measure γ ∈ P(X×Y ) with first marginal µ such
that
(1.1) γ({(x, y) ∈ X × Y : Φ(x, y, ν) = min
z∈Y
Φ(x, z, ν)}) = 1
where ν represents γ’s second marginal. The probability γ is naturally interpreted
by saying that γ(A×B) is the probability that agents have their type in A and an
action in B. The equilibrium is called pure if, in addition, γ is carried by a graph
i.e. µ-a.e. the agents play in pure strategy. Condition (1.1) means that agents
choose cost minimising strategies given their type and ν so that, finally, imposing
that ν is the second marginal of γ is a simple self-consistency requirement.
In the sequel, we will restrict ourselves to the additively separable case where
Φ(x, y, ν) = c(x, y) + V[ν](y), which seems to be a necessary limitation for the
optimal transport approach we will develop. Under this separability specification,
the connection with optimal transport is almost obvious: if γ is a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium it necessarily minimises the average of c among probability measures
having µ and ν (which is a priori unknown) as marginals i.e. it solves the optimal
transport problem:
(1.2) Wc(µ, ν) := inf
γ∈Π(µ,ν)
∫∫
X×Y
c(x, y) dγ(x, y)
where Π(µ, ν) is the set of joint probabilities having µ and ν as marginals. In an
euclidean setting, there are well-known conditions on c and µ which guarantee that
such an optimal γ necessarily is pure whatever ν is and this of course implies purity
of equilibria.
If we go one step further and assume that V[ν] is the differential of some func-
tional E (see Section 3 for a precise definition), it turns out that if ν is a minimiser of
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E [ν]+Wc(µ, ν) and γ solves (1.2) then it is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. This gives
a variational device to find equilibria: first find ν by minimising E [ν] +Wc(µ, ν)
and then find γ by solving the optimal transport problem (1.2) between µ and ν.
This variational approach actually gives new existence results. To the best of our
knowledge, usual general existence proofs are via fixed-point arguments and thus
require a lot of regularity for the dependence of V[ν] with respect to ν, in a com-
pact metric setting, it is typically asked that ν 7→ V[ν] is continuous (or at least
upper-semi continuous in some sense) from the set of probabilities equipped with
the weak-∗ topology to the set of continuous functions equipped with the supre-
mum norm. This is harmless if Y is finite but extremely restrictive in general,
in particular it excludes the case of a purely local dependence which is relevant
to capture congestion effects (actions that are frequently played are more costly).
In contrast, the variational approach will enable us to treat such local congestion
effects. If E (the primitive of V in some sense) is convex then equilibria and min-
imisers coincide and strict convexity gives uniqueness of the second marginal, ν,
of the equilibrium. Such a convexity is quite demanding in applications but we
shall prove that in an euclidean setting and for a quadratic c (and more generally
strictly convex c’s in dimension one), there is some hidden convexity (in the spirit
of the seminal results of McCann [1997]) in the problem from which one can de-
duce uniqueness of equilibria but also a characterisation in terms of a nonlinear
partial differential equation of Monge-Ampe`re type. This partial differential equa-
tion cannot be solved explicitly in general but, in dimension one, it is easy to solve
the variational problem numerically in an efficient way as we shall illustrate on
several examples. Another advantage of the variational approach is that it allows
for an elementary (in-)efficiency analysis of the equilibrium and the design of a
tax system to restore the efficiency of the equilibrium (see Section 5). Of course,
the variational approach described above presents strong similarities with the po-
tential games of Monderer and Shapley [1996] and our framework is very close to
that of Konishi et al. [1997] or LeBreton and Weber [2011] in the case of a finite
number of players; however we are not aware of any extension of the analysis of
Monderer and Shapley [1996] to the case of a continuum of players.
Apart from our results on Cournot-Nash equilibria, another objective of the
paper is to contribute to popularise the use of optimal transport in economics.
Several recent papers have fruitfully used optimal transport arguments in such dif-
ferent fields as hedonics and matching problems (Chiappori et al. [2010], Ekeland
[2010]), multidimensional screening (Carlier [2003], Figalli et al. [2011]) or urban
economics (Blanchet et al. [2012], Carlier and Ekeland [2007]). We believe that
cross-fertilisation between economics and optimal transport will rapidly develop.
This is why we have included in Appendix A some basic results from optimal
transport theory which we hope can serve as a comprehensive introduction to this
vast subject to an economists readership.
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The present introduction would neither be complete nor fair without an explicit
reference to the mean-field games theory of Lasry and Lions [2006a,b, 2007]. In-
deed, our variational approach is largely inspired by the Lasry and Lions optimal
control approach to mean-field games (that has some similarities with optimal
transport), but also mean-field games theory enables to treat considerably richer
situations than the somehow static one we treat here. Another line of research we
would like to mention concerns congestion games (another example of potential
games) and the literature on the cost of anarchy (see Roughgarden [2005] and the
references therein), indeed the variational approach we develop presents some simi-
larities with the variational approach to Wardrop equilibria on congested networks
and in both cases equilibria are socially inefficient.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model, define
equilibria and emphasise some connections with optimal transport. In Section 3,
we adopt a variational approach and prove that for a large class of interactions,
equilibria naturally arise as local minimisers of a certain functional. Section 4 is
devoted to further uniqueness and variational characterisation of equilibria results
thanks to notions of displacement convexity arising in optimal transport, we also
characterise the equilibrium via a certain nonlinear partial differential equation and
compute numerically the equilibrium in dimension one. Section 5 concludes. The
proofs as well as well as a presentation of various results from optimal transport
theory which are used throughout the paper are gathered in the Appendix.
2. THE EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
The model consists of a compact metric type space X equipped with a Borel
probability measure µ ∈ P(X), giving the distribution of types, a compact metric
action space Y , a reference1 Borel non-negative measure m0, a continuous function
c ∈ C(X × Y ) and interactions are captured by a map which to every action
distribution ν ∈ P(Y ) ∩ L1(m0) associates a function V[ν] defined m0-almost-
everywhere. Given an action distribution ν, x-type agents taking action y then
incur the additively separable cost c(x, y) +V[ν](y). The unknown is a probability
distribution γ ∈ P(X×Y ), with the interpretation that γ(A×B) is the probability
that an agent has her type in A and takes an action in Y , such a γ induces as action
distribution ν, its second marginal which we denote ν = piY #γ. By construction,
the first marginal of γ, piX#γ should be equal to µ. Since we will be interested by
efficiency (or rather inefficiency) properties of equilibria, we will also impose that
1The role of the reference measure m0 is here to capture purely local congestion effects as in the
examples below. In other words, we will require action distributions to be absolutely continuous
with respect to m0. This departs from the common assumption that the cost is well defined for
every action distribution and satisfies some strong continuity/semi-continuity with respect to the
weak ∗ topology of measures as in Mas-Colell [1984] or Kahn [1989].
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γ has finite social cost, where the latter is given by
SC =
∫∫
X×Y
(c(x, y) + V[ν](y)) dγ(x, y)
=
∫∫
X×Y
c(x, y) dγ(x, y) +
∫
Y
V[ν](y) dν(y)
since c is continuous the first term is finite for every γ, but the second requires the
action marginal ν to belong to the domain
(2.1) D := {ν ∈ L1(m0) : V[ν] ∈ L
1(ν)} = {ν ∈ L1(m0) :
∫
Y
|V[ν]| dν < +∞}.
Cournot-Nash equilibria are then defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 γ ∈ P(X × Y ) is a Cournot-Nash equilibria if its first marginal
is µ, its second marginal, ν, belongs to D and there exists ϕ ∈ C(X) such that
(2.2) c(x, y) + V[ν](y) ≥ ϕ(x) for all x ∈ X and m0-a.e. y with equality γ-a.e..
A Cournot-Nash equilibrium γ is called pure whenever it is carried by a graph i.e.
is of the form γ = (id, T )#µ for some Borel map T : X → Y .
The previous definition is slightly different from that of Mas-Colell [1984] because
we require the action distribution to be absolutely continuous with respect to
m0, so as to take into account congestion effects as explained in the examples
below. This makes the existence of equilibria nontrivial, indeed, when ν 7→ V[ν]
is continuous from (P(Y ), w−*) to (C(Y ), ‖.‖∞) (as is the case for instance when
V[ν](y) =
∫
Y φ(y, z) dν(z) with φ continuous) standard fixed-point arguments
immediately give the existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria but here, we do not
have such regularity.
2.1. Examples
Holiday choice
Let us consider a population of agents whose location is distributed according
to some probability distribution µ ∈ P(X) where X is some compact subset of R2
(say). These agents have to choose their holidays destination (possibly in mixed
strategy). The set of possible holiday destinations is some compact subset of the
plane Y (it can be X, a finite set, ...). The commuting cost from x to y is c(x, y). In
addition to the commuting cost, agents incur costs resulting from interactions with
other agents, this is captured by a map ν 7→ V[ν] that can be modelled as follows.
A natural effect that has to be taken into account is congestion, i.e. the fact that
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more crowded location results in more disutility for the agents. Congestion thus
requires to consider local effects and actually imposes that ν is not too concen-
trated; a way to capture this is to impose that ν is absolutely continuous with
respect to some reference probability measure m0. Still denoting by ν the Radon-
Nikodym derivative of ν, a natural congestion cost is of the form y 7→ f(ν(y))
with f non-decreasing. In addition to the negative externality due to congestion
effect, there may be a positive externality effect due to the positive social inter-
actions between agents which can be captured through a non-local term of the
form y 7→
∫
Y φ(y, z) dν(z) where for instance φ(y, .) is minimal for z = y so that
the previous term represents a cost for being far from the rest of the population.
Finally, the presence of purely geographical factors (e.g. distance to the sea) can
be reflected by a term of the form y 7→ v(y). The total externality cost generated
by the distribution ν combines the three effects of congestion, positive interactions
and geographical factors and can then be taken of the form
V[ν](y) = f(ν(y)) +
∫
Y
φ(y, z) dν(z) + v(y).
Technological choice
Consider now a simple model of technological choice in the presence of external-
ities. There is a set of consumers indexed by a type x ∈ X drawn according to the
probability µ, and a set of technologies Y for a certain good (cell-phone, computer,
tablet...). On the supply side, assume there is a single profit maximising profit firm
with convex production cost F (y, .) producing technology y, the supply (equals de-
mand at equilibrium) of this firm is thus determined by the marginal pricing rule
p(y) = ∂νF (y, ν(y)). Agents aim to minimise with respect to y a total cost which
is the sum of their individual purchasing cost c(x, y)+p(y) = c(x, y)+∂νF (y, ν(y))
and an additional usage/maintenance or accessibility cost which is positively af-
fected by the number of consumers having purchased similar technologies i.e. a
term of the form
∫
Y φ(y, z) dν(z) where φ is increasing in the distance between
technologies y and z.
2.2. Connection with optimal transport and purity of equilibria
For ν ∈ P(Y ), let Π(µ, ν) denote the set of probability measures on X×Y having
µ and ν as marginals and let Wc(µ, ν) be the least cost of transporting µ to ν for
the cost c i.e. the value of the Monge-Kantorovich optimal transport problem:
Wc(µ, ν) := inf
γ∈Π(µ,ν)
∫∫
X×Y
c(x, y) dγ(x, y)
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let us also denote by Πo(µ, ν) the (nonempty) set of optimal transport plans i.e.
Πo(µ, ν) := {γ ∈ Π(µ, ν) :
∫∫
X×Y
c(x, y) dγ(x, y) =Wc(µ, ν)}.
A first link between Cournot-Nash equilibria and optimal transport is based on
the following straightforward observation.
Lemma 2.2 If γ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and ν denotes its second marginal
then γ ∈ Πo(µ, ν).
Proof: Indeed, let ϕ ∈ C(X) be such that (2.2) holds and let η ∈ Π(µ, ν) then
we have ∫∫
X×Y
c(x, y) dη(x, y) ≥
∫∫
X×Y
(ϕ(x) − V[ν](y)) dη(x, y)
=
∫
X
ϕ(x) dµ(x)−
∫
Y
V[ν](y) dν(y) =
∫∫
X×Y
c(x, y) dγ(x, y)
so that γ ∈ Πo(µ, ν). Q.E.D.
The previous proof also shows that ϕ solves the dual of Wc(µ, ν) (see Ap-
pendix (A.3)) i.e. maximises the functional∫
X
ϕ(x) dµ(x) +
∫
Y
ϕc(y) dν(y)
where ϕc denotes the c-transform of ϕ i.e.
(2.3) ϕc(y) := min
x∈X
{c(x, y) − ϕ(x)} .
In an euclidean setting, there are well-known conditions on c and µ which guar-
antee that such an optimal γ necessarily is pure whatever ν is. It is the case for
instance if µ is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, c(x, y)
is a smooth and strictly convex function of x− y (see McCann and Gangbo [1996]
who extended the seminal results of Brenier [1991] in the quadratic cost case),
or more generally, when it satisfies a generalised Spence-Mirrlees condition (see
Carlier [2003] for details):
Corollary 2.3 Assume that X = Ω where Ω is some open connected bounded
subset of Rd with negligible boundary, that µ is absolutely continuous with respect to
the Lebesgue measure, that c is differentiable with respect to its first argument, that
∇xc is continuous on R
d × Y and that it satisfies the generalised Spence-Mirrlees
condition:
for every x ∈ X, the map y ∈ Y 7→ ∇xc(x, y) is injective,
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then for every ν ∈ P(Y ), Πo(µ, ν) consists of a single element and the latter is of
the form γ = (id, T )#µ hence every Cournot-Nash equilibrium is pure.
3. A VARIATIONAL APPROACH
In this section, we will see that in many relevant cases, one may obtain equilibria
by the minimisation of some functional over a set of probability measures2. The
main assumption for this variational approach to be valid is that the interaction
map V[ν] has the structure of a differential i.e. that V[ν] can be seen as the first
variation of some function ν 7→ E [ν]. In this case, the variational approach is
based on the observation that the equilibrium condition is the first-order optimality
condition for the minimisation of Wc(µ, ν) + E [ν].
3.1. Interaction maps which are differentials
The main assumption for the variational approach to be valid is that ν 7→ V[ν]
is a differential in the following sense:
Definition 3.1 (Differential) Let D be defined by (2.1). The map ν ∈ D 7→ V[ν]
is a differential on D if D is convex and there exists E: D → R such that for every
(ρ, ν) ∈ D2, V[ν] ∈ L1(ρ) and
lim
ε→0+
E [(1− ε)ν + ερ]− E [ν]
ε
=
∫
Y
V[ν] d(ρ− ν)
i.e. V[ν] is the first variation of E which we denote V[ν] =
δE
δν
.
Before going any further, let us consider some examples to illustrate the previous
definition.
Local term
Let us consider first the case of a local dependence, again m0 is our reference
measure and for ν ∈ D := P(Y ) ∩ L1(m0) and m0-a.e. y:
V[ν](y) = f(y, ν(y))
for some continuous f . Assume first that f is bounded and define, for all ν ∈ D:
(3.1) F (y, ν) =
∫ ν
0
f(y, s) ds, E [ν] =
∫
Y
F (y, ν(y)) dm0(y) .
2Note the analogy with the variational approach of Monderer and Shapley [1996] for potential
games, i.e. games whose equilibria can be obtained by minimising some potential function.
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Then since F is Lipschitz in ν uniformly in y, it easily follows from Lebesgue’s
dominated convergence theorem that V[ν] is the differential of E on D. Now, rather
assume that f satisfies the growth condition
(3.2) a(να − 1) ≤ f(y, ν) ≤ b(να + 1)
for some a ≥ 0, b > 0, α > 0, m0-a.e. y and every ν ≥ 0. For p = α + 1,
the corresponding energy functional E is then defined for all ν ∈ D := P(Y ) ∩
Lp(m0) as above by (3.1). Thanks to (3.2) and Lebesgue’s dominated convergence
theorem, V is the differential of E on D, V[ν] ∈ Lp
′
(m0) (with p
′ the conjugate
exponent of p i.e. p′ = p/(p − 1)) as soon as ν ∈ D. Apart from the technical
growth condition (which is useful to apply Lebesgue’s theorem and guarantee that
V[ν]ν is integrable) we therefore see that local V’s are differentials. In Section 3.3,
we will treat local V’s under a different Inada-like condition on f which is more
customary in economics and will ensure that ν remains positive hence simplifying
the equilibrium/optimality condition.
Non-local interaction term and the role of symmetry
Let us now consider the case of (pairwise) interactions where V[ν] is defined by
V[ν](y) =
∫
Y
φ(y, z) dν(z)
for some φ ∈ C(Y × Y ). It is then natural to define the quadratic functional
E [ν] =
1
2
∫∫
Y×Y
φ(y, z) dν(y) dν(z) .
By expanding in ε, E [ν + ε(ρ− ν)], its differential is immediate to compute
lim
ε→0
E [ν + ε(ρ− ν)]− E [ν]
ε
=
1
2
∫∫
φ(y, z)[dν(y) d(ρ− ν)(z) + dν(z) d(ρ− ν)(y)]
=
1
2
∫∫
[φ(y, z) + φ(z, y)] dν(z) d(ρ− ν)(y) .
So that
δE
δν
(y) =
∫
Y
φsym(y, z) dν(z) : φsym(y, z) =
φ(y, z) + φ(z, y)
2
.
Hence V is the differential of E on P(Y ) as soon as φ is symmetric3 i.e. φ(y, z) =
φ(z, y) (which is the case for instance if φ is the function of the distance between y
3Let us remark that in the case of a finite number of players, the role of symmetry for the
potential approach to work was already pointed out in LeBreton and Weber [2011].
10 A. BLANCHET & G. CARLIER
and z). Note that the assumption that V is a differential requires φ to be symmet-
ric.4 Of course, one can combine the previous examples and consider a V which is
the sum of a symmetric interaction term and a local term, such V’s still have the
structure of a differential.
3.2. Minimisers are equilibria
Throughout this paragraph, we assume that
(3.4) V[ν] =
δE
δν
on D.
We then consider the variational problem
(3.5) inf
ν∈D
Jµ[ν] where Jµ[ν] :=Wc(µ, ν) + E [ν].
To prove that minimisers of (3.5) are equilibria, we first need to be able to differ-
entiate the term Wc(µ, ν) with respect to ν, this is possible thanks to Lemma A.1
proved in Appendix A but it requires more structure on X, µ and c: in particular X
is a connected subset of Rd, c is differentiable with respect to x and µ is equivalent
to the Lebesgue measure.
Theorem 3.2 (Minimisers are equilibria) Assume that V[ν] satisfies (3.4) with
D = P(Y )∩Lp(m0) for some p ∈ [1,+∞[ and that the assumptions of Lemma A.1
hold true. If ν solves (3.5) and γ ∈ Πo(µ, ν) then γ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
See Appendix B.1 for the proof. Let us mention however that the optimality
condition for (3.5) is the following: there is a constant M such that
(3.6)
{
ϕc + V[ν] ≥M
ϕc + V[ν] =M ν-a.e. ,
4In a similar way, if we consider the case of higher-order interactions
V[ν](y) =
∫
Ym
φ(y, .) dν⊗m =
∫
Ym
φ(y, z1, . . . , zm) dν(z1) . . . dν(zm)
where φ ∈ C(Y m+1) satisfies the symmetry relations
(3.3) φ(y, z1, . . . , zm) = φ(z1, y, . . . , zm) = · · · = φ(zm, z1, . . . , y),
for all (y, z1, . . . , zm) ∈ Y
m+1, then V is the differential of
E [ν] =
1
m+ 1
∫
Ym+1
φ dν⊗(m+1).
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where ϕc is the c-transform of ϕ as in (2.3).
To deduce an existence result from Theorem 3.5, assume that V[ν] is defined for
ν ∈ P(Y ) ∩ L1(m0) by
(3.7) V[ν](y) := f(y, ν(y)) +
∫
Y
φ(y, z) dν(z)
where φ ∈ C(Y ×Y ) is symmetric, f is continuous and non-decreasing with respect
to its second argument and satisfies the growth condition (3.2) for some a > 0,
b > 0 and α > 0. For p = α+1, the corresponding energy functional is then defined
for all ν ∈ D := P(Y ) ∩ Lp(m0) by
E [ν] =
∫
Y
F (y, ν(y)) dm0(y) +
1
2
∫∫
Y 2
φ(y, z) dν(y) dν(z)
where F is defined by (3.1). The functional F (y, .) is convex and satisfies the growth
condition
a(p−1νp − ν) ≤ F (y, ν) ≤ b(p−1νp + ν) .
Hence V[ν] ∈ Lp
′
(m0) as soon as ν ∈ D and thus, by Ho¨lder’s inequality, V[ν]ρ ∈
L1(m0) for every ρ and ν in D.
Corollary 3.3 (Existence of equilibria by minimisation) Assume that the as-
sumptions of Lemma A.1 hold, that ν 7→ V[ν] is of the form (3.7) where f and φ
satisfy the assumptions above, then (3.5) admits minimisers in P(Y ) ∩ Lp(m0) so
that there exists Cournot-Nash equilibria.
The proof is given in Appendix B.2. Note that this in particular provides exis-
tence of equilibria results for the holiday and technological choice model examples
above.
Remark 3.4 Under the assumptions of the previous corollary, one can prove
that the minimisers are actually bounded: indeed let ν be such a minimiser either
ν(y) = 0 or ν(y) > 0 and for m0-a.e. such points by the optimality condition (3.6)
and (3.2) one should have for some constant M
a(ν(y)α − 1) ≤ f(y, ν(y)) =M − ϕc(y)−
∫
Y
φ(y, z) dν(z) .
Since ϕ is a c-transform, it is continuous hence bounded on Y and the integral
term is bounded since φ is. We therefore have ν ∈ L∞(m0).
Let us now emphasise the role of convexity in the variational approach. As ex-
pected if E is convex, then finding equilibria and minimising Jµ are equivalent:
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Proposition 3.5 (Equivalence in the convex case) Assume that the assumptions
of Theorem 3.2 are satisfied. If E is convex on D then the following statements are
equivalent:
• ν solves (3.5) and γ ∈ Πo(µ, ν),
• γ is an equilibrium and ν = ΠY #γ.
If moreover E is strictly convex the following uniqueness result holds:
Corollary 3.6 (Uniqueness in the strictly convex case) Assume that the as-
sumptions of Theorem 3.2 are satisfied. If E is strictly convex then all equilibria
share the same second marginal ν. If in addition, the assumptions of Corollary 2.3
are satisfied then there is at most one Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
As an application, let us observe that if the assumptions of Lemma A.1 are satis-
fied and if V[ν](y) = f(y, ν(y)) with an f which is increasing in ν and satisfies (3.2)
then there exists a unique minimiser so the previous uniqueness result holds. This
applies naturally to the technological choice equilibrium problem as well as to the
holiday choice example with pure congestion or, more generally, in the case where
the congestion effects dominate as explained below.
In the case where
E [ν] =
∫
Y
F (y, ν(y)) dm0(y) +
1
2
∫∫
Y 2
φ(y, z) dν(y) dν(z)
the second non-local term typically favours the concentration of ν (when φ(y, z)
is increasing with the distance between y and z for instance) and it is not convex,
while the congestion terms fosters dispersion and is convex. There may however
be some compensation between the two terms that makes E convex. For instance,
by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the quadratic form∫
Y
ν2(y) dm0(y) +
∫∫
Y 2
φ(y, z) dν(y) dν(z)
is positive definite hence convex as soon as∫
Y 2
φ2(y, z) dm0(y) dm0(z) < 1.
Whence in this case, the uniqueness result of Corollary 3.6 applies.
3.3. The case of Inada’s condition
We now consider the case where V contains a local congestion term that satisfies
an Inada-like condition:
(3.8) lim
ν→0+
f(ν) = −∞ and lim
ν→+∞
f(ν) = +∞.
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This will imply that minimisers of (3.5) are positive m0-a.e.. The optimality con-
dition ϕc + V[ν] = M , for some constant M , will therefore be satisfied m0-a.e.
which implies the regularity of ν. More precisely, let us consider the case where
the interaction are given for ν ∈ P(Y ) ∩ L1(m0) by the map:
(3.9) V[ν](y) = f(ν(y)) +
∫
Y
φ(y, z) dν(z)
(for the sake of simplicity we have dropped the dependence in y of f) where
• φ ∈ C(Y × Y ) is symmetric,
• f : (0,+∞) 7→ R is continuous increasing, locally integrable on [0,+∞) and
satisfies the Inada condition (3.8).
We then define F by F (0) = 0 and F ′ = f so that F is strictly convex, continuous
on [0,+∞) and C1(0,+∞), bounded from below and coercive i.e. F (ν)/ν → +∞
as ν → +∞. As before, for any ν in P(Y ) ∩L1(m0), we define the associated cost
functional
E [ν] =


∫
Y
F (ν) dm0 +
1
2
∫∫
Y 2
φ(y, z) dν(y) dν(z) if
∫
Y
F (ν) dm0 < +∞
+∞ otherwise.
The typical example we have in mind is f(ν) = log(ν) and F (ν) = ν log ν − ν,
or simply F (ν) = ν log ν since we are only dealing with probability measures. In
this case, the domain of E consists of absolutely continuous measures with finite
entropy. Again, we look for equilibria by solving the minimisation problem (3.5).
The implication of Inada’s condition on the interiority of minimisers is given by
the following:
Lemma 3.7 (Existence and positivity of minimisers) Under the above assump-
tions, the variational problem (3.5) admits solutions and if ν is such a solution
ν ≥ δ m0-a.e. for some δ > 0 and ν ∈ L
∞(m0).
The proof (see Appendix B.4) relies on the fact that since f(0+) = −∞ the
functional E abhors a vacuum. Now that we know that minimisers ν exist and
are bounded from above and bounded away from 0, under the assumptions of
Lemma A.1 it is easy to see, as in the previous paragraph, that they necessarily
are equilibria and satisfy the optimality condition (3.6):
f(ν(y)) +
∫
Y
φ(y, z) dν(z) + ϕc(y) =M
for some constant M and where as usual ϕ is the Kantorovich potential between
µ and ν and ϕc is its c-transform. Note that this equality is true not only ν-a.e.
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but m0-a.e., one can then invert this relation to deduce that ν coincides m0 with
the continuous function
(3.10) ν(y) = f−1
(
M − ϕc(y)−
∫
Y
φ(y, z) dν(z)
)
.
In particular there exists equilibria that have a continuous representative.5 Re-
lation (3.10) is however not very tractable in general since it involves the very
indirect quantity ϕc and an integral term. We will see in Section 4 how it can be
simplified and reformulated as a nonlinear partial differential equation in the case
of a quadratic cost.
For the moment, the Inada condition has just enabled us to prove some fur-
ther regularity properties of minimisers hence of some special equilibria. Let us
summarise all this by:
Theorem 3.8 (Main results under the Inada condition) Let V be of the form (3.9)
where f and φ satisfy the assumptions of this paragraph. If ν solves (3.5) and γ ∈
Πo(µ, ν) then γ is an equilibrium; in particular, there exists equilibria. Moreover
any minimiser ν of (3.5) is bounded and bounded away from 0 and coincides m0-
a.e. with the continuous function given by (3.10).
If, in addition, E is convex γ is an equilibrium if and only if γ ∈ Πo(µ, ν) where
ν solves (3.5).
If, in addition, E is strictly convex there is a uniqueness of the equilibrium second
marginal ν.
4. HIDDEN CONVEXITY AND FURTHER UNIQUENESS RESULTS
So far, our variational approach has enabled us to prove the existence of equilib-
ria by the minimisation problem (3.5). However, the previous results are not totally
satisfying since in general there might exist equilibria that are not minimisers and
even if we are only interested in the special equilibria obtained by minimisation,
optimality conditions like (3.10) are not tractable enough to provide a full char-
acterisation. Under further convexity conditions that are quite stringent we have
seen that equilibria necessarily are minimisers and obtained uniqueness of both. In
the case where
E [ν] =
∫
Y
F (y, ν(y)) dm0(y) +
1
2
∫∫
Y×Y
φ(y, z) dν(y) dν(z)
5Inada’s condition is actually not essential to obtain a relation of the form (3.10). Indeed, in
the case of a power congestion function, f(ν) = να, α > 0, using the positive part function, one
obtains a similar relation
ν(y) =
(
M − ϕc(y)−
∫
Y
φ(y, z) dν(z)
)1/α
+
.
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there is a competition between the convexity of the congestion term that favours
dispersion and the non-convexity of the interaction term so that in general nothing
can be said about the convexity of E in the usual sense. We shall see however,
that some convexity structure, more adapted to optimal transport, can be used
to derive new uniqueness and characterisation results. The aim of this section is
precisely to exploit some hidden convexity structure in one dimension and in higher
dimensions when the cost is quadratic. This goal can be achieved thanks to the
very powerful notion of displacement convexity (or some slight variant of it) due
to McCann [1997]. In recent years, these notions of convexity, intimately linked
to optimal transport, have proved to be an extremely useful and flexible tool in
particular in the study of nonlinear diffusions, to our knowledge, this is the first
time they are used in an economic context, see also Blanchet et al. [2012]. We
refer to Appendix A for a very short presentation and Section 4.1 for a detailed
exposition in the easier one-dimensional case. Much more on this rich subject can
be found in the books Ambrosio et al. [2005], Villani [2003, 2009].
4.1. Hidden convexity in dimension one
Let us start with the simple one-dimensional case where the intuition is easy
to understand: the functional Jµ is not convex with respect to ν but it is with
respect to T , the optimal transport map from µ to ν. Let us take X = Y = [0, 1],
m0 is the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1], µ is absolutely continuous with respect to
the Lebesgue measure, and assume that V[ν] takes the form:
V[ν](y) = f(ν(y)) + v(y) +
∫
[0,1]
φ(y, z) dν(z)
and that
• the transport cost c is of the form c(x, y) = C(x − y) where C is strictly
convex and differentiable,
• f is increasing,
• v is convex on [0, 1] and φ is convex, symmetric, differentiable and has a
locally Lipschitz gradient.
As already noted the corresponding cost
E [ν] :=
∫ 1
0
F (ν(y)) dy +
1
2
∫∫
[0,1]2
φ(y, z) dν(y) dν(z) +
∫ 1
0
v(y) dν(y)
(with F ′ = f) is not convex in the usual sense in general and neither is the
functional Jµ =Wc(µ, .) + E .
However, we shall see that Jµ has good convexity properties when one considers
the following interpolation. Let (ρ, ν) ∈ P([0, 1])2 then there is a unique optimal
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transport map T0 (respectively T1) from µ to ν (respectively from µ to ρ) for the
cost c and it is non-decreasing (see Villani [2003]). For t ∈ [0, 1], let us define:
νt := Tt#µ where Tt := ((1 − t)T0 + tT1)
then by construction, the curve t 7→ νt connects ν0 = ν to ν1 = ρ.
Definition 4.1 A functional J : P(Y ) → R ∪ {+∞} is called displacement
convex whenever t ∈ [0, 1] 7→ J [νt] is convex (for every choice of endpoints ν and
ρ), it is called strictly displacement convex when, in addition J [νt] < (1− t)J [ν]+
tJ [ρ] when t ∈ (0, 1) and ρ 6= µ.
We claim that Jµ is strictly displacement convex; indeed, take (ν, ρ) two proba-
bility measures in the domain of E (which is convex by convexity of F ), define νt
as above and, let us consider the four terms in Jµ separately:
• By definition of Wc, νt and the strict convexity of C we have
Wc(µ, νt) ≤
∫ 1
0
C(x− ((1− t)T0(x) + tT1(x))) dµ(x)
≤ (1− t)
∫ 1
0
C(x− T0(x)) dµ(x) + t
∫ 1
0
C(x− T1(x)) dµ(x)
= (1− t)Wc(µ, ν) + tWc(µ, ρ)
with a strict inequality if t ∈ (0, 1) and ν 6= ρ,
• By construction∫ 1
0
v dνt =
∫ 1
0
v(Tt(x)) dµ(x)
which is convex with respect to t, by convexity of v,
• Similarly∫∫
[0,1]2
φ(y, z) dνt(y) dνt(z) =
∫∫
[0,1]2
φ(Tt(x), Tt(y)) dµ(x) dµ(y)
is convex with respect to t, by convexity of φ,
• The convexity of the remaining congestion term is more involved. Since νt =
Tt#µ and Tt is non-decreasing, at least formally
6 we have νt(Tt(x))T
′
t (x) =
µ(x), by the change of variables formula we also have∫ 1
0
F (νt(y)) dy =
∫ 1
0
F (νt(Tt(x)))T
′
t (x) dx =
∫ 1
0
F
( µ(x)
T ′t(x)
)
T ′t(x) dx
and we conclude by observing that α 7→ F (µ(x)α−1)α is convex and that
T ′t(x) is linear in t.
6see Ambrosio et al. [2005], Villani [2003, 2009] for a rigorous justification.
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Under the assumptions above, Jµ is therefore strictly displacement convex and
thus admits at most one minimiser (indeed if ν and ρ were different minimisers,
by strict displacement convexity, one would have Jµ[ν1/2] <
1
2Jµ[ν] +
1
2Jµ[ρ]).
Actually more is true (see Appendix B.5 for details): if γ is an equilibrium then its
second marginal solves (3.5) and therefore is unique. Since c satisfies the generalised
Spence-Mirrlees condition (see Corollary 2.3), we deduce the following uniqueness
result
Theorem 4.2 (Uniqueness of an equilibrium by displacement convexity in dimen-
sion one) Under the assumptions above, we have the equivalence
ν is a minimiser to (3.5) and γ ∈ Πo(µ, ν) ⇔ γ is an equilibrium
and since Jµ is strictly displacement convex, there is uniqueness of the equilibrium
(which is actually necessarily pure).
4.2. Hidden convexity under quadratic cost
The arguments of the previous paragraph can be generalised in higher dimensions
when the transport cost is quadratic. Throughout this section, we will assume the
following:
• X = Y = Ω where Ω is some open bounded convex subset of Rd,
• µ is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure (that will
be the reference measure m0 from now on) and has a positive density on Ω,
• c is quadratic i.e.
c(x, y) :=
1
2
|x− y|2, (x, y) ∈ Rd × Rd,
• V again takes the form
V[ν](y) = f(ν(y)) + v(y) +
∫
Y
φ(y, z) dν(z)
where v is convex, f satisfies the assumptions of Section 3.3 and φ ∈ C(Rd×
R
d) is symmetric and C1,1loc (i.e. C
1 with a locally Lipschitz gradient).
Again denoting by F the primitive of f that vanishes at 0, the corresponding
energy reads
E [ν] =
∫
Y
F (ν(y)) dy +
∫
Y
v(y) dν(y) +
1
2
∫∫
Y 2
φ(y, z) dν(z) dν(y).
Note that as c is quadratic, Brenier’s Theorem (see Theorem A.2) implies the
uniqueness and the purity of optimal plans γ between µ and an arbitrary ν. The
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variational problem (3.5) then takes the form
(4.1) inf
ν∈P(Ω)
Jµ[ν] where Jµ[ν] :=
1
2
W22 (µ, ν) + E [ν]
with W22 (µ, ν) is the squared-2-Wasserstein distance between µ and ν i.e.:
W22 (µ, ν) := inf
γ∈Π(µ,ν)
∫
X2
|x− y|2 dγ(x, y).
Two more structural assumptions are needed to guarantee the strict convexity
of Jµ along generalised geodesics with base µ (see Appendix A for details), namely
McCann’s condition:
(4.2) ν 7→ νdF (ν−d) is convex non-increasing on (0,+∞)
and that φ is convex. Note that McCann’s condition is satisfied by power functions
with an exponent larger than 1 as well as by the entropy F (ν) = ν log(ν).
In contrast with Theorem 3.8 where minimisers are equilibria but the reverse is
not always true, convexity along generalised geodesics ensures the converse recip-
rocal property:
Theorem 4.3 (Equilibria and minimisers coincide, uniqueness and regularity un-
der generalized convexity) Under the assumptions above, we have the equivalence
ν is a minimiser to (4.1) and γ ∈ Πo(µ, ν) ⇔ γ is an equilibrium
Moreover, there exists a unique equilibrium (which is actually pure) and the second
marginal ν of this equilibrium has a continuous density.
4.3. A partial differential equation for the equilibrium
In the quadratic cost framework of Paragraph 4.2, our aim now is to write the
optimality condition (3.10) in the form of a nonlinear and non-local equation partial
differential equation of Monge-Ampe`re type. For computational simplicity, we take
v = 0 and f(ν) = log(ν) but any convex, C1,1loc , symmetric v and any increasing f
satisfying McCann’s condition would lead to a similar partial differential equation.
Let us recall that the unique minimiser/equilibrium ν satisfies (3.10) and is actually
characterised by this condition. In this equation, the less explicit term is ϕc. Thanks
to Brenier’s theorem (see Appendix A), this term can be made more explicit, as
follows: the Brenier map T between µ and ν is the gradient of some convex function,
T = ∇u with u convex, and similarly the Brenier map between ν and µ is ∇u∗
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where u∗ is the Legendre transform of u. In the case of a quadratic cost, u and u∗
are related to the Kantorovich potential ϕ and its c-transform ϕc through
(4.3) ϕ(x) =
1
2
|x|2 − u(x), ϕc(y) =
1
2
|y|2 − u∗(y), ∀(x, y) ∈ Ω× Ω .
When ∇u is smooth enough, the Monge-Ampe`re equation, see (A.6), reads:
µ(x) = det(D2u(x)) ν(∇u(x)), ∀x ∈ Ω
which has to be supplemented with the natural sort of boundary condition
(4.4) ∇u(Ω) = Ω.
We may then rewrite the optimality condition (3.10) as
(4.5) ν(y) = C exp
(
−
1
2
|y|2 + u∗(y)−
∫
Y
φ(y, z) dν(z)
)
where C is a normalisation constant that makes the total mass of the right hand
side be 1 on Ω. Since u is defined up to an additive constant, one may actually
choose C = 1. As ∇u#µ = ν, we first have∫
Y
φ(∇u(x), z) dν(z) =
∫
Ω
φ(∇u(x),∇u(z)) dµ(z) .
On the other hand, using the well-known convex analysis identity
u∗(∇u(x)) = x · ∇u(x)− u(x)
and performing the change of variable y = ∇u(x) in (4.5), the Monge-Ampe`re
equation then becomes
(4.6) µ(x) = det(D2u(x)) exp
(
−
1
2
|∇u(x)|2 + x · ∇u(x)− u(x)
)
×
exp
(
−
∫
Ω
φ(∇u(x),∇u(z)) dµ(z)
)
.
The equilibrium problem is therefore equivalent to a non-local and nonlinear partial
differential equation.
This kind of partial differential equation is rather complicated. However, in di-
mension 1, i.e. when Ω is an open interval, which we can assume to be (0, 1), the
boundary condition (4.4) is u′(0) = 0, u′(1) = 1 and the Monge-Ampe`re equa-
tion (4.6) simplifies to
µ(x) = u′′(x) exp
(
−
1
2
u′(x)2 + x · u′(x)− u(x)−
∫
(0,1)
φ(u′(x), u′(z)) dµ(z)
)
.
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Note that this differential equation automatically implies the strict convexity of
u. We do not know whether this equation can be solved numerically in an iterative
way but will see how the equilibrium can be computed in one dimension thanks to
a convenient reformulation of (4.1) as explained below.
4.4. Numerical computations in dimension one
Let Ω = (0, 1), m0 be the Lebesgue measure on (0, 1), µ be absolutely continuous
with respect to m0 with a positive density still denoted µ. Consider again
7 the
variational problem
(4.7) inf
ν
Jµ[ν]
where Jµ[ν] :=
1
2
W22 (µ, ν) +
∫ 1
0
ν log ν +
1
2
∫∫
[0,1]2
φ(y, z) dν(y) dν(z)
where φ is C1,1loc , convex and symmetric. Looking for ν amounts to look for its
rearrangement or quantile function:
G(x) := inf{λ : ν([0, λ]) ≥ x}, ∀x ∈ (0, 1).
Note that G is non-decreasing and G#m0 = ν. We also denote by H the quantile of
µ. It is then well known (see [Villani, 2003, Section 2.2] or [Ambrosio et al., 2005,
Theorem 6.0.2]) that
W22 (µ, ν) =
∫ 1
0
|G(x)−H(x)|2 dx.
Moreover since G#m0 = ν, we have∫∫
[0,1]2
φ(y, z) dν(y) dν(z) =
∫∫
[0,1]2
φ(G(x), G(θ)) dx dθ .
And since ν is regular the change of variable formula yields∫ 1
0
ν(x) log(ν(x)) dx =
∫ 1
0
ν(G(x)) log(ν(G(x)))G′(x) dx = −
∫ 1
0
log(G′(x)) dx ,
as, by definition of G, ν(G(x))G′(x) = 1 a.e.
Therefore reformulating (4.7) in terms of quantile consists in minimising the
strictly convex functional
1
2
∫ 1
0
|G−H|2 −
∫ 1
0
log(G′(x)) dx+
1
2
∫∫
[0,1]2
φ(G(x), G(θ)) dx dθ
7Again the choice of a logarithmic congestion function is not so essential, power congestion
functions can be considered as well.
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subject to the boundary conditions G(0) = 0, G(1) = 1. The discretisation of this
variational problem is easy to solve using standard gradient descent methods, see
Figure 18.
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Figure 1.— The distribution µ of the agents is dash line and the solution ν to (4.7)
in the case f(x) = x8, φ(z) = 10−4|z|2 and v = (x− 10)4.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We conclude the paper, by two remarks, for the sake of simplicity, we adopt
exactly the same framework and notations, as in Section 4.2.
5.1. Implementation by taxes
By Theorem 4.3 the unique equilibrium is the unique minimiser of the functional
Jµ. It would therefore be tempting to interpret this result as a kind of welfare
theorem. A simple comparison between Jµ and the total social cost tells us however
that the equilibrium is not efficient. Indeed, the total social cost SC[ν] is the sum
8Actually, in our simulations, we have relaxed the condition that the support of ν is [0, 1] i.e.
the boundary conditions G(0) = 0, G(1) = 1.
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of the transport cost W22 (µ, ν)/2 and the additional cost
∫
Y V[ν](y) ν(y) dy i.e.
SC[ν] =
1
2
W22 (µ, ν)+
∫
Y
f(ν(y)) dν(y)+
∫
Y
v dν+
∫∫
Y 2
φ(y, z) dν(y) dν(z) .
The second term represents the total congestion cost and the last one the total
interaction cost. The functional Jµ whose minimiser is the equilibrium has a similar
form, except that in its second term f(ν)ν is replaced by F (ν) (with F ′ = f) and
the interaction term is divided by 2. The equilibrium corresponds indeed to the
case where agents selfishly minimise their own cost
c(x, .) + V[ν] = c(x, .) + f(ν(.)) + v +
∫
Y
φ(y, z) dν(z) .
This individual minimisation has of course no reason to correctly estimate the
marginal effect of individual behaviour on the total social cost. In other words,
there is some gap between the equilibrium and the efficient (social-cost minimising)
configurations, and, since we are dealing with a situation with externalities, this
is actually not surprising. The computation of the equilibrium and the optimum
can be done numerically in dimension 1 by using the same kind of numerical
computations as explained in Section 4.4, see Figure 2.
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Figure 2.— The optimum in continuous line and the equilibrium in dash line on the
left. The corresponding taxes on the right.
The natural way to restore efficiency of the equilibrium is the design by some
social planner of a proper system of tax/subsidies which, added to V[ν], will imple-
ment the efficient configuration (or at least a stationary point of the social cost).
Thanks to our variational approach, a tax system that restores the efficiency is
easy to compute (up to an additive constant):
Tax[ν](y) = f(ν(y)) ν(y)− F (ν(y)) +
∫
Y
φ(y, z) dν(z).
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The two terms in Tax[ν] represent respectively a correction to the individual esti-
mation of congestion cost and to the individual estimation of interaction cost. A
similar inefficiency of equilibria, arises in the slightly different framework of con-
gestion games, where it is usually referred under the name cost of anarchy, which
has been extensively studied in recent years (see Roughgarden [2005] and the ref-
erences therein). In our Cournot-Nash context, we may similarly define the cost
of anarchy as the ratio of the worst social cost of an equilibrium to the minimal
social cost value:
Cost of anarchy :=
max{SC[νe] : νe equilibrium}
minν SC[ν]
.
In the previous numerical example of Figure 2, both the equilibrium and the op-
timum are unique and the cost of anarchy can be numerically computed as being
approximately 1.8.
5.2. A dynamical perspective
Instead of minimising Jµ directly, we may think that agents start with some
distribution of strategies (that is not an equilibrium) and adjust it with time by a
sort of gradient descent dynamics to decrease their individual cost dynamically. At
least formally, a way to reach the equilibrium (or minimiser of Jµ) is then to put it
into the dynamical perspective of the minimising movement scheme as follows. Fix
a time step τ > 0 and start with an initial configuration of strategies ν0. The first
step of the minimising movement scheme selects a new distribution of strategies
ν1 close to ν0 (in W2) but also decreasing Jµ by
ν1 ∈ argminν
{
1
2τ
W22 (ν0, ν) + Jµ[ν]
}
.
And then it iterates the process by choosing
(5.1) νk+1 ∈ argminν
{
1
2τ
W22 (νk, ν) + Jµ[ν]
}
.
This sort of Wasserstein Euler scheme was first introduced in Jordan et al. [1998]
for the Fokker-Planck equation. Under suitable conditions it is possible to pass
the continuous limit τ → 0+ in the minimising scheme (5.1) and prove that the
solution converges in some sense to the continuous evolution equation

∂tν + div
(
−ν∇
(
δJµ
δν
))
= 0,
νt=0 = ν0
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which is the gradient flow of Jµ in the Wasserstein space (see Ambrosio et al. [2005]
for a detailed exposition of the theory). By construction Jµ is a Lyapunov function
of this equation and even though the equation may have non-unique solutions, by
Lyapunov theory, it can be shown under appropriate conditions that its trajectories
converge in large time to the unique minimiser of Jµ i.e. the equilibrium. If we go
back to the individual level, it can be shown that the equation above corresponds
to the fact that each agent modifies her strategy according to the gradient flow of
her individual cost.
We obtain a sequence of densities which converges to the equilibrium, see Fig-
ure 3. The descent algorithm is very fast and the computed equilibrium is very
stable with respect to the initial density for the gradient descent as shown in the
left hand figure of Figure 4.
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Figure 3.— Convergence and stabilisation toward the equilibrium in the case of a
logarithmic congestion, cubic interaction, and a potential v(x) := (x − 5)3 with 1l[0,1] as
initial guess. The inverse of the cumulative function on the left and the corresponding
density on the right.
Acknowledgements The authors acknowledge the support of the Agence Na-
tionale de la Recherche through the projects ANR-09-JCJC-0096-01 EVaMEF and
ANR-07-BLAN-0235 OTARIE. The authors wish to thank Jocelyn Donze, Andre´
Grimaud, Michel Le Breton, Je´roˆme Renault, Franc¸ois Salanie´ and the partici-
pants to the IAST LERNA - Eco/Biology and Chicago University Seminars for
many interesting and fruitful discussions about the present work.
APPENDIX A: THE OPTIMAL TRANSPORT TOOLBOX
This appendix just gives some basic results from optimal transport theory that we have used
in the paper, for a detailed exposition of this rich and rapidly developing subject, we refer the
interested reader to the very accessible textbook Villani [2003] or Ambrosio et al. [2005], Villani
[2009] or, the more probability-oriented textbook Rachev and Ru¨schendorf [1998].
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Figure 4.— Convergence and stabilisation toward the equilibrium in the case of a
logarithmic congestion, cubic interaction with an initial guess made of two bumps. The
potential is v(x) := (x− 5)3 on the left and v(x) := (x− 1/2)3 on the right.
Kantorovich duality
Let X and Y be two compact spaces equipped respectively with the Borel probability measures
µ ∈ P(X) and ν ∈ P(Y ). For µ ∈ P(X) and T , Borel: X → Y , T#µ denotes the push forward (or
image measure) of µ through T which is defined by T#µ(B) = µ(T
−1(B)) for every Borel subset
B of Y or equivalently by the change of variables formula
(A.1)
∫
Y
ϕ dT#µ =
∫
X
ϕ(T (x)) dµ(x), ∀ϕ ∈ C(X).
A transport map between µ and ν is a Borel map such that T#µ = ν. Now, let c ∈ C(X × Y )
be some transport cost function, the Monge optimal transport problem for the cost c consists in
finding a transport T between µ and ν that minimises the total transport cost
∫
X
c(x, T (x)) dµ(x).
A minimiser is then called an optimal transport. Monge problem is in general difficult to solve (it
may even be the case that there is no transport map, for instance it is impossible to transport
one Dirac mass to a sum of distinct Dirac masses), this is why Kantorovich relaxed Monge’s
formulation as
(A.2) Wc(µ, ν) := inf
γ∈Π(µ,ν)
∫
X×Y
c(x, y) dγ(x, y)
where Π(µ, ν) is the set of transport plans between µ and ν i.e. Borel probability measures on
X×Y having µ and ν as marginals. Since Π(µ, ν) is weakly ∗ compact and c is continuous, it is easy
to see that the infimum of the linear program definingWc(µ, ν) is attained at some γ, such optimal
γ’s are called optimal transport plans (for the cost c) between µ and ν. If there is an optimal γ
which is induced by a transport map i.e. is of the form γ = (id, T )#µ for some transport map
T then T is obviously an optimal solution to Monge’s problem. Another advantage of the linear
relaxation is that it possesses a dual formulation that can be very useful. This dual formulation
consists in maximising the linear form
∫
X
ϕ dµ+
∫
Y
ψ dν among all pairs (ϕ,ψ) ∈ C(X) × C(Y )
such that ϕ(x) + ψ(y) ≤ c(x, y), it is easy to see that this can be reformulated as a maximisation
over ϕ only:
(A.3) Wc(µ, ν) := sup
ϕ∈C(X)
{∫
X
ϕ dµ+
∫
Y
ϕc dν
}
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where ϕc is the c-concave transform of ϕ i.e.
ϕc(y) := min
x∈X
{c(x, y)− ϕ(x)}, ∀y ∈ Y.
Formula (A.3) is usually called Kantorovich duality formula and a maximiser ϕ in (A.3) is called
a Kantorovich potential between µ and ν for the cost c. The existence of Kantorovich potentials
under our assumptions is well-known (see Rachev and Ru¨schendorf [1998], Villani [2003, 2009])
and we observe that if ϕ is a Kantorovich potential then so is ϕ+ C for every constant C.
We have used in Section 3 the following result on the uniqueness of the Kantorovich potential
and the differentiability of Wc(µ, ν) with respect to ν:
Lemma A.1 Assume that X = Ω where Ω is some open bounded connected subset of Rd with
negligible boundary, that µ is equivalent to the Lebesgue measure on X (that is both measures have
the same negligible sets) and that for every y ∈ Y , c(., y) is differentiable with ∇xc bounded on
X×Y , let ν ∈ P(Y ) then there exists a unique (up to an additive constant) Kantorovich potential
ϕ between µ and ν and for every ρ ∈ P(Y ) one has
lim
ε→0+
Wc(µ, ν + ε(ρ− ν))−Wc(µ, ν)
ε
=
∫
Y
ϕc d(ρ− ν).
Proof: The proof of the uniqueness of the Kantorovich potential ϕ between µ and ν up to an
additive constant can be found for instance in [Carlier and Ekeland, 2007, Proposition 6.1]. As a
normalisation we choose the potential ϕ such that ϕ(x0) = 0 where x0 is some given point of X.
To shorten notations, set νε = ν + ε(ρ− ν), thanks to Kantorovich duality formula (A.3) we have
(A.4) ε−1[Wc(µ, νε)−Wc(µ, ν)] ≥
∫
Y
ϕc d(ρ− ν)
and similarly if ϕε denotes the Kantorovich potential between µ and νε such that ϕε(x0) = 0, we
have
ε−1[Wc(µ, νε)−Wc(µ, ν)] ≤
∫
Y
ϕcε d(ρ− ν).
Now it is well-known that (ϕε)ε is bounded and uniformly equi-continuous uniformly with respect
to ε hence, thanks to Ascoli’s Theorem, up to a sub-sequence, it converges uniformly to some
ϕ ∈ C(X) such that ϕ(x0) = 0 and it is easy to see that ϕ is a Kantorovich potential between µ
and ν so that ϕ = ϕ and ϕcε converges to ϕ
c. We then have
lim sup
ε→0+
ε−1[Wc(µ, νε)−Wc(µ, ν)] ≤
∫
Y
ϕc d(ρ− ν).
The desired result thus follows from (A.4). Q.E.D.
When X = Y and denoting by d the distance on Y , for p ∈ [1,+∞[, the p-Wasserstein distance
between µ ∈ P(X) and ν ∈ P(X) is by definition
(A.5) Wp(µ, ν) :=
(
inf
γ∈Π(µ,ν)
{∫
X×Y
d(x, y)p dγ(x, y)
})1/p
The Wasserstein distances are indeed distances and they metrise the weak ∗ topology of P(Y ).
For p = 1, it is well-known that the Kantorovich duality formula can be rewritten as
W1(µ, ν) = sup
{∫
X
ϕ d(µ− ν) : ϕ 1-Lipschitz
}
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so that for every Lipschitz continuous function ϕ on X, one has∣∣∣ ∫
X
ϕ d(µ− ν)
∣∣∣ ≤ Lip(ϕ,X)W1(µ, ν),
an inequality we will use several times later on. As a simple illustration of the interest of the
distance W1, let us equip Y
m with the distance (x, y) = (x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . ym) 7→ dm(x, y) :=∑m
k=1 d(xk, yk) for ν and θ in P(Y ), let γ be an optimal transport plan between µ and ν for W1
then since γ⊗m := γ ⊗ · · · ⊗ γ has marginals ν⊗m and θ⊗m, we have
W1(ν
⊗m, θ⊗m) ≤
∫
Ym×Ym
dm dγ
⊗m = mW1(ν, θ) .
Which shows in particular that if (νn)n weakly ∗ converges to ν then (ν
⊗m
n )n weakly ∗ converges
to ν⊗m i.e.
∫
Ym
ϕ dν⊗mn converges to
∫
Ym
ϕ dν⊗m as n→∞ for every φ ∈ C(Y m).
Of particular interest is also the quadratic case p = 2 in an euclidean setting for which a brief
summary of the main results used in the paper is given in the next paragraphs.
The quadratic case and Monge-Ampe`re equation
We now restrict ourselves to the quadratic case, the solution of the quadratic optimal transport
problem is due to Yann Brenier whose path-breaking paper Brenier [1991] totally renewed the
field of optimal transport and was the starting point of an extremely active stream of research
since the 90’s.
Theorem A.2 (Brenier’s theorem) Let µ ∈ P(Rd) be absolutely continuous with respect to the
Lebesgue measure and compactly supported and ν ∈ P(Rd) be compactly supported, then the
quadratic optimal transport problem
W 22 (µ, ν) := inf
γ∈Π(µ,ν)
∫∫
Rd×Rd
|x− y|2 dγ(x, y)
possesses a unique solution γ which is in fact a Monge solution γ = (id, T )#µ. Moreover T = ∇u
µ-a.e. for some convex function u and ∇u is the unique (up to µ-a.e. equivalence) gradient of a
convex function transporting µ to ν; T = ∇u is called the Brenier map between µ and ν.
In fact the previous theorem holds under much more general assumptions (it is enough that µ
and ν have finite second moments and that µ does not charge sets of Hausdorff dimension less
than d − 1, see McCann [1995] or Villani [2003]). Brenier’s theorem roughly says that there is a
unique optimal transport for the quadratic cost and that it is characterised by the fact that it is
of the form ∇u with u convex, in other words, solving ∇u#µ = ν with u convex determines ∇u
uniquely µ-a.e.. When we have additional regularity, i.e. when µ and ν have regular densities (still
denoted µ and ν) and ∇u is a diffeomorphism between the support of µ and that of ν, thanks
to the change of variables formula, we find that u solves the Monge-Ampe`re partial differential
equation:
(A.6) µ = ν(∇u) det(D2u).
A deep regularity theory due to Luis Caffarelli: Caffarelli [1992a,b] implies that the Brenier map
is a smooth diffeomorphism when in addition µ and ν are smooth, bounded away from 0 and have
convex supports, in particular the Monge-Ampe`re equation is satisfied in this case which justifies
the computations of Section 4.3.
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Convexity along generalised geodesics
The last ingredient from optimal transport theory that we have used (in Section 4) is the
powerful notion of displacement convexity along generalised geodesics due to Ambrosio, Gigli-
Savare´ Ambrosio et al. [2005]9. As in Section 4.2, we assume that X = Y = Ω where Ω is some
open bounded convex subset of Rd, that the cost is quadratic, that m0 is the Lebesgue measure
on X and that µ is absolutely continuous with respect to m0 and has a positive density on Ω. In
particular for every ν ∈ P(X), the Brenier’s map between µ and ν is well-defined. Generalised
geodesics with base µ for the Wasserstein distance W2 and the corresponding notion of convexity
are defined as follows
Definition A.3 (Convexity along generalised geodesics) Let ν ∈ P(X), ρ ∈ P(X), let T0 be
the Brenier’s map between µ and ν and let T1 be Brenier’s map between µ and ρ, the generalised
geodesic with base µ between ν and ρ is the curve of measures t ∈ [0, 1] 7→ νt := ((1−t)T0+tT1)#µ.
The functional J : P(X)→ R∪ {+∞} is called convex along generalised geodesics with base µ if
for every pair of endpoints ν and ρ in P(X) and for every t ∈ [0, 1], one has
J [νt] ≤ (1− t)J [ν] + tJ [ρ].
If, in addition, the previous inequality is strict for t ∈ (0, 1) and ρ 6= ν, J is called strictly convex
along generalised geodesics with base µ.
In Section 4.2, we were interested in the strict convexity along generalised geodesics with base
µ of the functional Jµ defined by (4.1). As in Paragraph 4.1, the convexity of
t 7→
∫
Y×Y
φ(y, z) dνt(y) dνt(z) and t 7→
∫
Y
v dνt
directly follows from the convexity of φ and v respectively. As for the convexity of t 7→
∫
Y
F (νt(y))
under McCann’s condition:
(A.7) ν 7→ νdF (ν−d) is convex non-increasing on (0,+∞),
it follows from [Ambrosio et al., 2005, Proposition 9.3.9]. Finally, in the functional Jµ defined by
(4.1), we had the term W22 (µ, .), to see that it is strictly convex along generalised geodesics with
base µ, we can proceed exactly as we did for Wc(µ, .) in dimension one in Paragraph 4.1.
APPENDIX B: PROOFS OF THE RESULTS
B.1. Proof of Theorem 3.2
Let ν be a solution of (3.5), ρ ∈ D and ε ∈ (0, 1), we then have ε−1(Jµ[ν+ε(ρ−ν)]−Jµ[ν]) ≥ 0.
Using the fact that V[ν] is the first variation of E and Lemma A.1, we thus get
(B.1)
∫
Y
(ϕc + V[ν]) dρ ≥
∫
Y
(ϕc + V[ν]) dν
9Actually this notion of convexity is a slight variant of the notion of displacement convexity
which first appeared in the seminal work of McCann [1997]. It is known thatW22 (µ, ν), as a function
of ν is not displacement convex in the sense of McCann (see example 9.1.5. in Ambrosio et al.
[2005]) and this is the very reason why, following Ambrosio, Gigli and Savare´, we consider convexity
along generalised geodesics with base µ rather than the initial notion of McCann. Let us however
indicate that, in dimension one, both notions coincide.
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where ϕ is a Kantorovich potential between µ and ν (it is unique up to an additive constant by
Lemma A.1 and this constant plays no role since ρ and ν have the same mass). Minimising the
left-hand side of (B.1), with respect to Lp probabilities ρ, this yields that ν-a.e.
ϕc + V[ν] = inf
ρ∈D
∫
Y
(ϕc + V[ν]) dρ =M
whereM := Essinf(ϕc+V[ν]) denotes the essential infimum of (ϕc+V[ν]) i.e. the largest constant
that bounds (ϕc+V[ν]) from belowm0-a.e.. Since γ is an optimal transport plan we have c(x, y) =
ϕ(x) + ϕc(y) γ-a.e. whereas by definition c(x, z) ≥ ϕ(x) + ϕc(z) for all (x, z) ∈ X × Y . We thus
have {
c(x, z) + V[ν](z) ≥M + ϕ(x) for all x ∈ X and m0-a.e. z ∈ Y
c(x, y) + V[ν](y) =M + ϕ(x) for γ-a.e. (x, y).
This proves that γ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
B.2. Proof of Corollary 3.3
Thanks to Theorem 3.2, it is enough to prove that (3.5) admits solutions and to recall that
the set Πo(µ, ν) is nonempty. Let (νn)n be a minimising sequence of (3.5). Thanks to the growth
condition (3.2), (νn)n is bounded in L
p(m0). It thus admits a (not relabelled) sub-sequence that
converges weakly in Lp(m0) (and thus in particular weakly ∗ in P(Y )) to some ν ∈ L
p(m0).
By the convexity of F (y, .), the first term in E is lower-semi continuous for the weak topology
of Lp(m0). By the continuity of φ the second term in E is continuous for the weak-∗ topology
of P(Y ). Finally, the lower-semi continuity of Wc(µ, .) for the weak-∗ topology straightforwardly
follows from the Kantorovich duality formula (A.3). We thus have
inf
ν
Jµ(ν) = lim inf
n
{Wc(µ, νn) + E [νn]} ≥ Wc(µ, ν) + E [ν] .
So that ν solves (3.5).
B.3. Proof of Proposition 3.5
Assume that γ is an equilibrium and let ν be its second marginal. Let then ϕ be a Kantorovich
potential between µ and ν such that
(B.2)
{
ϕc + V[ν] ≥ 0 m0-a.e.
ϕc + V[ν] = 0 ν-a.e.
Let ρ ∈ D, thanks to the Kantorovich duality formula (A.3), we first have
Wc(µ, ρ)−Wc(µ, ν) ≥
∫
Y
ϕc d(ρ− ν) .
By convexity of E and (3.4), we obtain
E [ρ]− E [ν] ≥
∫
Y
V[ν] d(ρ− ν)
hence, finally using (B.2) and the fact that ρ is absolutely continuous with respect to m0, we get
Jµ[ρ]− Jµ[ν] ≥
∫
Y
(ϕc + V[ν]) d(ρ− ν) ≥ 0
which means that ν solves (3.5).
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B.4. Proof of Lemma 3.7
The existence of a minimiser is similar to the proof of Corollary 3.3 since the coercivity of F
ensures that minimising sequences are uniformly integrable and its convexity guarantees sequential
weak lower semi continuity of Jµ.
Let ν solve (3.5) and let us prove that it is bounded away from zero. Let us assume by contraction
that m0({ν ≤ λ}) > 0 for every λ > 0. Let δ0 > 0, δ ∈ (0, δ0) (to be chosen later on). Let
A := {x : δ0 ≤ ν(x) ≤M} where M > 0 is large enough so that m0(A) > 0. For small ε > 0 such
that ε < δm0(A)/2 then define
νε := ν + ε(uAδ − uA)
where Aδ := {ν ≤ δ} and for m0(B) > 0, uB denotes the (sort of uniform probability on B)
uB := m0(B)
−11lB . Since ε < δm0(A)/2 and ν > δ on A, νε is a probability measure. By
optimality of ν, we then have
(B.3) 0 ≤ Jµ[νε]− Jµ[ν] =Wc(µ, νε)−Wc(µ, ν) + E [νε]− E [ν].
Denoting by ϕε a Kantorovich potential between µ and νε, we first have
Wc(µ, νε)−Wc(µ, ν) ≤ ε
∫
Y
ϕcε d(uAδ − uA) .
And since ϕcε has a modulus of continuity that is uniform with respect to ε (that of c) and ϕ
c
ε
can be normalised so as to vanish at the same point, ϕcε is uniformly bounded independently of
ε and δ. So that Wc(µ, ν)−Wc(µ, νε) ≤ C1ε for some constant C1. In a similar way, one finds a
constant C2 such that for ε small enough and uniformly in δ one has
1
2
∫∫
Y 2
φ(y, z) dνε(y) d(νε − ν)(z) ≤ C2ε.
Now it remains to estimate the last term namely∫
Y
[F (νε)− F (ν)] dm0 =
∫
Aδ
[
F (ν + εm0(Aδ)
−1)− F (ν)
]
dm0
+
∫
A
[
F (ν − εm0(A)
−1)− F (ν)
]
dm0
since F is Lipschitz on [δ0/2,M ] the second term can be bounded from above by C3ε for a constant
C3 again independent of δ and ε. Now let C := C1 + C2 + C3 thanks to Inada’s condition there
is some δ1 < δ0/2 such that f ≤ −C − 1 on (0, 2δ1]. Choosing δ ≤ δ1 and ε small enough so that
εm0(Aδ)
−1 ≤ δ1, we then have∫
Aδ
[
F (ν + εm0(Aδ)
−1)− F (ν)
]
dm0 ≤ (−C − 1)ε.
Putting everything together, the latter inequality gives the desired contradiction to (B.3).
The proof of the upper bound is similar: one assumes that ν /∈ L∞(m0) and then considers a
perturbation of the form νε := ν+ε(uC−uCM ) with CM := {ν ≥M},M large and C well chosen,
the computations are the same as before and the contradiction comes from the Inada condition
at +∞: F ′(ν) = f(ν)→ +∞ as ν → +∞.
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B.5. Proof of Theorem 4.3
Uniqueness of a minimiser follows directly from the strict convexity along generalised geodesics
with base µ of Jµ which follows from McCann’s condition (4.2), the convexity of v and φ and the
strict convexity along generalised geodesics with base µ of W22 (µ, .).
Let us now assume that γ is an equilibrium and that ν is its second marginal, then, for some
constant M , we have:
(B.4) f(ν) + v(y) +
∫
Y
φ(y, z) dν(z) + ϕc ≥M a.e. with an equality ν-a.e.
Thanks to Inada’s condition and the fact that the right hand side is continuous, this implies ν
is bounded away from zero so that (B.4) actually is an equality (Lebesgue) almost everywhere
V[ν] + ϕc =M and thus ν satisfies
ν(y) = f−1
(
M − v(y)−
∫
Y
φ(y, z) dν(z)− ϕc(y)
)
and is therefore continuous.
Let us now prove that ν solves (4.1), let ρ be another probability measure (which we can assume
to have a positive and continuous density as well), and let t ∈ [0, 1] → νt denote the generalised
geodesic with base µ joining ν and ρ, i.e. νt = Tt#µ := ((1− t)T0 + tT1)#µ where T0 (resp. T1)
denotes the Brenier map between µ and ν (resp. ρ). Since (T0, T0 + t(T1 − T0))#µ has marginals
ν and νt we have
(B.5) W1(ν, νt) ≤
∫
Y
|Tt − T0| dµ ≤ tdiam(Y ) .
By the convexity of Jµ along generalised geodesics with base µ, setting g(t) = Jµ[νt] and using
g(t) ≤ (1− t)g(0) + tg(1) for all t ∈ (0, 1) we have:
Jµ[ρ]− Jµ[ν] = g(1)− g(0) ≥
1
t
[g(t)− g(0)] =
1
t
(Jµ[νt]− Jµ[ν]).
Let us write νt as νt := ν + tht, by the (usual) convexity of F and that of W
2
2 (µ, .), we first have
1
t
(
1
2
W22 (µ, νt) +
∫
Y
F (νt) dm0 −
1
2
W22 (µ, ν)−
∫
Y
F (ν) dm0
)
≥
∫
Y
[f(ν) + ϕc]ht dm0
Let us now expand
∫∫
Y 2
φ(y, z) dνt(y) dνt(z) in powers of t as
1
2t
∫∫
Y 2
φ(y, z) d [(ν + tht)(y)(ν + tht)(z)− ν(y)ν(z)] =
∫∫
Y 2
φ(y, z) dht(y) dν(z) +Rt
where
2|Rt| =
1
t
∣∣∣ ∫∫ φ(y, z) d(νt−ν)(y) d(νt−ν)(z)∣∣∣ ≤ 1
t
W1(νt, ν)×Lip(ψt, Y ) ≤ diam(Y ) Lip(ψt, Y )
where the last inequality follows from (B.5) and ψt is defined by
ψt(y) :=
∫
Y
φ(y, z) d(νt − ν)(z) =
∫
Y
(φ(y, Tt(x))− φ(y, T0(x))) dµ(x) .
Since ∇φ is locally Lipschitz and Tt − T0 is uniformly bounded by t diam(Y ) we find that there
is a constant C such that Lip(ψt, Y ) ≤ Ct so that Rt = O(t). Putting everything together and
using (B.4) we get
Jµ[ρ]− Jµ[ν] ≥
∫
Y
(f(ν(y)) + v(y) +
∫
Y
φ(y, z) dν(z) + ϕc(y)) dht(y) +Rt
=
∫
Y
(V[ν] + ϕc) dht +Rt ≥M
∫
Y
dht +Rt = Rt → 0 as t→ 0
+
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which proves that ν is a minimiser.
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